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DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
In the twentieth century, television has become the domi-
nant medium for national and international communication.' With
the advent of satellite broadcasting, viewers of the world are now
able to see such significant events as man's lunar space travels
and the Olympic games.
Communication through the use of satellites is a present re-
ality. Direct Broadcast Satellites (D.B.S.) provide simultaneous
transmissions of newsworthy events to a worldwide audience2
through the use of only three orbiting satellites. 3
This capability presents the means of using this form of com-
munication in a variety of beneficial ways. For example, pro-
1. Heinz-Dietrich Fischer, Forms and Functions of Supranational Com-
munication, in INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS 5 (H. Fischer & G. Merill ed.
1970).
2. Current technology has primarily used point-to-point broadcasting. This
system requires that the television signal be transmitted by wire or cable to a
sending station on earth. The signal is then transmitted to an orbiting satellite
which rebroadcasts the signal to an earth receiving station where it is then sent,
by wire or cable, to a regular television broadcasting station for broadcast into
the home. Chayes & Chazen, Policy Problems in Direct Broadcasting from Satel-
lites, 5 STAN. J. INT'L. STUD. 4 (1970). For a more detailed discussion of com-
munication satellite technology, see AMERICAN INSTrrUTE OF ASTRONAUTICS AND
AERONAUTICS, 19 COMMUNICATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY (R. Mar-
sten ed. 1966).
Direct Broadcast Satellites are being developed in two distinct modes. One
mode requires the use of a community receiver to pick up the signal from a
satellite and relay it to home sets via cable. In the other mode, the signal will
be broadcast directly from the satellite to the home receiver. Seamons, Returns
from Space Exploration: Overview on Space Achievements, in ORGANIZING
SPACE ACTIvITIES FOR WORLD NEEDS (E.A. Steinhoff ed. 1971). The community
receiver mode is the less costly and will be put into use for the first time by
the United States in 1974. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
Report of the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites, U.N. Doc. A/AC.
105/117, at 3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Working Group Report]. The United
States will use Direct Broadcast Satellites (D.B.S.) in the remote areas of the
Rocky Mountain States, Alaska, and the Appalachians in order to improve edu-
cation and the dissemination of news.
3. The satellites are placed in orbit at an altitude of 22,300 miles from
the earth. At this altitude the satellits orbit the earth at same speed as the
earth revolves, thereby seeming to be fixed in one position. This is termed a
geostationary orbit. Each of the three satellites can effectively transmit over
one-third of the earth's land mass. LAY & TAUBENFIELD, THE LAW RELATING
TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE (1970).
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graming via Direct Broadcast Satellites can be used to supplement
education of persons located in remote areas, to disseminate news
of impending disasters or storms, and to present sporting and cul-
tural events. This medium, used properly, may aid in the ex-
change and understanding of divergent social, political, and re-
ligious viewpoints in an effort to promote world peace.'
Since it is possible for a nation with the necessary technology
to broadcast directly into the homes of citizens of other nations,
the use of Direct Broadcast Satellites raises a number of prob-
lems. Conceivably, the content of such broadcasts may prove
offensive to a receiving nation to such an extent that message
content may be regulated or censored.'
Several underdeveloped nations fear that transmissions via
Direct Broadcast Satellites may undermine cultural mores or the
prevailing political system.6 Other nations, including the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, object to the use of Direct Broad-
cast Satellites on the ground that propaganda transmissions may
lead to social discontent, racial hatred, or war.7
Recognition of these problem areas necessitated a series of
conferences to study and to make proposals regarding the regula-
tion of program content. 8 In October of 1972, the United Na-
4. D'Arch, Direct Broadcast Satellites and Freedom of Information, in
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 149 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971).
See also Working Group Report, supra note 2, at 10.
5. Some, but certainly not all of the other problem areas include frequency
allocation and management as indicated in Leive, Regulating the Use of the Ra-
dio Spectrum, 5 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 21 (1970); initiation and regulation of
national and regional systems discussed in Colino, Intelstat, Doing Business in
Outer Space, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 17 (1967); Draft "Intersputnik Agree-
ment," reproduced in 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1368 (1968); Note, The Legal
Problems of International Telecommunications with Special Reference to Intelsat,
20 TORONTO L.J. 287 (1970). See also Errlia, Problems Raised by the Content
of Television Programs Transmitted by Telecommunications, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 149 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971).
6. Gold, Direct Broadcast Satellites: Implications for Less-Developed
Countries and for World Order, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 66 (1971). Mr. Gold points
out that many countries fear being forced into accepting U.S. programming with
its emphasis on individualism and activism. See also, Smith, The Legal Ordering
of Satellite Telecommunications: Problems and Alternatives, 44 IND. L.J. 337
(1969).
7. Zhukov, Tendencies and Prospects of the Development of Space Law:
The Soviet Viewpoint, in NEW FRONTIERS IN SPACE LAW 73 (E. McWhinney
& M. Bradley ed. 1969).
8. Introductory Report on Telecommunications by Satellite in INTERNA-
TIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQIUM
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 166 (New York 1966).
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tions, after considering various regulatory proposals, adopted the
U.S.S.R. proposal to assign the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space to study the problem of regulation.' At this junc-
ture, the United States opposed the U.S.S.R. proposal on the
ground that insufficient emphasis was placed on the free flow
of information and ideas and that the beneficial aspects of Direct
Broadcast Satellites were not recognized.'"
When the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites met
in June of 1973, the United States issued a precautionary plea
that regulation of D.B.S. would be premature at that time." Al-
though the Working Group was unable to establish definite reg-
ulations,' 2 two significant draft proposals were annexed to the
final Report.'1
Since neither draft proposal was adopted by the Working
Group, both will be reconsidered in 1974. This Comment will
analyze both regulatory proposals. The provisions dealing with
regulation of program content will be measured against the stand-
ards of international law and the first amendment to the United
States Constitution to determine whether the United States should
become a Party to an agreement embodying these provisions.
I. INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES AFFECTING THE FREE
FLOW OF INFORMATION
A. Regulation of Freedom of Information in Outer Space
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies' 4 is the primary document in a consid-
eration of the regulation of activities in outer space. The treaty
states that the activities of man in outer space will be regulated
according to international law and the Charter of the United Na-
9. G.A. Res. 2916, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 14, U.N. Doc. A. 8730
(1972).
10. See U.N. Monthly Chronicle Vol. IX, No. 11, at 37 (1972) and 67
U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 686-87 (1972).
11. 69 U.S. DEP'T. STATE BULL. 197 (1973).
12. Working Group Report, supra note 2, at 13. The Working Group on
Direct Broadcast Satellites will hereinafter be referred to as the Working Group.
13. Id., annex III and annex IV.
14. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Outer Space Treaty].
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tions.1 This means that the U.N. Charter, other positive interna-
tional law, and customary international law, will each affect the
regulation of man's activities in space.
The preamble of the Outer Space Treaty is the only section
which deals directly with the use of communications in space.
The preamble contains a statement which condemns the use of
any propaganda "designed or likely to provoke or encourage
any threat to the peace. . .. ,,16 The legal basis for the prohibi-
tion is a 1947 General Assembly resolution condemning certain
types of propaganda.17  At the very least, the preambular state-
ment and the wording of article III of the Outer Space Treaty
can be used to prevent the use of propaganda which is likely
to provoke or actually cause a breach of the peace. 18
There is disagreement as to whether the Outer Space Treaty
applies to space communications. 19 Realistically viewed, the pur-
pose of the Outer Space Treaty was to set down broad guidelines
for the regulation of all of man's activities in space. In view
of the emphasis placed on the treaty by the Working Group,
20
it is likely that the treaty will be used as a basis to regulate spe-
cific activities in space. 21  There is no reason to assume that it
cannot be used to support a legal regime for satellite broadcast-
ing. 22
15. Id., at 208. Article III provides that:
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the explora-
tion and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bod-
ies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the
United States, hereinafter referred to as the U.N. Charter, in the inter-
est of maintaining international peace and security and promoting in-
ternational cooperation and understanding.
16. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14.
17. G.A. Res. 110, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947). For purposes of analysis,
it is assumed that the types and definitions of the prohibited propaganda men-
tioned in the preamble are identical to those contained in the 1947 U..N. resolu-
tion.
18. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, article III.
19. Valters, Perspectives in the Emerging Law of Satellite Communication,
5 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 53, 64 (1970). Valters points out that the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. disagree as to whether or not specific provisions of the treaty apply
to satellite communication.
20. Working Group Report, supra note 2. See also G.A. RES. 2916, 27
U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. 30, U.N. Doc. A 8730 (1972).
21. Other regulatory documents covering man's activities in space refer to
the Outer Space Treaty as one basis for the regulation. Working Group Report,
supra note 2, annex III & IV.
22. See Valters, Perspectives in the Emerging Law of Satellite Communica-
tion, 5 STAN. J. INT'L STuD. 53, 64-65 (1970)..
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The Outer Space Treaty states that the principles embodied
in the U.N. Charter apply to outer space. 23  The U.N. Charter
does not make any specific reference to the use of speech or
the concept of freedom of information. 24  However, it does take
a positive approach to strengthening and promoting peace. 5 The
U.N. Charter also states that "promoting and encouraging hu-
man rights . . . constitutes one of the purposes of the United
Nations. Article 2 requires that member nations respect the prin-
ciple of sovereignty 27 and refrain from the threat or use of force
against the "territorial integrity or political independence of any
State . . ."28 Based on the foregoing, a nation could reasonably
argue that the only types of communication which can, or should
be, prohibited are those which seek to breach the peace or vio-
late the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of another na-
tion. The inclusion of the concept of freedom of information
as one of the basic human rights to be promoted and encouraged
does not necessarily follow from a reading of the U.N. Charter.
The Outer Space Treaty also states that outer space activity
will be regulated according to principles of international law. 29
There has never been general ratification of a treaty dealing with
the concept of freedom of information. 0 The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights3 does specifically point to and advocate
this concept as a basic human right. Article 19 of the Declara-
tion of Human Rights expresses the view that one has the right
to freedom of opinion and is free to seek, receive, and impart
information using any media and crossing any frontier.12  Yet,
there is some dispute as to whether the Declaration of Human
Rights has been accepted as customary international law.
33
23. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, Preamble.
24. The Charter states that members will observe basic human rights but
does not mention any specific rights. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 55.
25. Id., art. 1, paras. 1 & 2.
26. Id., art. 1, para. 3.
27. Id., art. 2, para. 1.
28. Id., art. 2, para. 4.
29. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, Preamble.
30. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Convent on Civil and Political Rights].
31. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter referred to as
the Declaration of Human Rights].
32. Id., art. 19. This article sets out what the General Assembly believes
are the rights involved in the free flow of information.
33. Eleanor Roosevelt, one of the U.S. representatives involved in the vote
Vol. 4
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While the document has had substantial support among nations,
it is difficult to assume that it will be accepted as a statement
of international law since the treaty designed to implement it has
not been ratified by the requisite number of nations.3 4
While there is little positive or customary international law
upon which to base a strong case for the free flow of information,
awareness of the concept is widespread. There has been a re-
cent clamor over its status3 5 and some current resolutions seem
to indicate that the principle is thriving, even if not universally
accepted. 6  One could argue that the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) Declarara-
tion of Guiding Principles in the Use of Satellite Broadcasting
for the Free Flow of Information, the Spread of Education and
Greater Cultural Exchange3 7 is evidence that the concept is gain-
ing acceptance. In its preamble, the UNESCO Declaration cites
the U.N. Charter, the Declaration of Human Rights, and the Outer
Space Treaty as its guiding principles .
3
The UNESCO Declaration was adopted in 1972 and pre-
sented to the Working Group on D.B.S. in 1973. 31 Although
no action was taken on the Declaration, it will be among the
agenda items facing the Working Group in their 1974 meeting.40
It may be difficult to characterize the UNESCO Declaration as
evidence of the growing acceptance of the concept of freedom
of information in light of the fact that a number of representatives
on the declaration, stated that it was not to be taken as a binding agreement
or a statement of law. 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243
(1965). See also Von Glahn, The Case for Legal Control of "Liberation" Prop-
aganda, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 553 (1966). Others have expressed the
view that the Declaration has a great deal of influence on many nations in the
conduct of their relations. O'Brien, International Propaganda and Minimum
Public Order, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 589 (1966).
34. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 30. This covenant
incorporates the Declaration of Human Rights and is designed to implement that
document as a treaty.
35. Working Group Report, supra note 2.
36. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 30. This document,
which considers freedom of information a basic right, has not come into force
as a treaty. Thus, there is no positive international law dealing with freedom
of information. See also UNESCO Declaration in text accompanying notes 37-
38 infra.
37. See U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/109 (1973).
38. Id., at 4.
39. Working Group Report, supra note 2, at 2.
40. Id., at 16.
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to the Working Group failed to mention it at all.41 In fact, in
speaking of the Declaration, a UNESCO spokesman said "It is
simply a statement, a declaration which binds no one and which
we feel does not establish principles to which objections could
be taken."
42
Positive international law does not support the concept of
freedom of information. Even though the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights was unanimously adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations,43 it does not yet
have the force of a treaty.4 4  There exists an additional question
as to exactly what freedom of information means.45
B. Propaganda and Direct Satellite Broadcasting
Propaganda is of primary concern for the regulation of
D.B.S.40 The capability of D.B.S. to reach such vast audiences
makes it an excellent medium for propaganda purposes. Based
upon the existing prohibitions against various types of propaganda
and the proposals submitted to the Working Group, a nation has
ample legal principles on which to base actions taken against un-
wanted propaganda.
4 7
A party to the Outer Space Treaty is held responsible for
all its activities in space. 48  Jamming is considered as one means
of stopping propaganda, but several factors mitigate against its
use. The United Nations has passed resolutions against the jam-
ming of broadcasts,4 and jamming is not available to a majority
41. Working Group Report, supra note 2, at 1. Although the UNESCO
report was before the committee, many delegations made no mention of it in
their summaries of the conference. Id., at 2.
42. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 195/P.V. 113, at 27 (1972).
43. [1966] U.N.Y.B. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 418 (1966).
44. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 30. The covenant
is still open for signature.
45. Working Group Report, supra note 2, at 13. The chairman of the
Working Group here summarized the many conflicting views on freedom of in-
formation.
46. Thomas, Approaches to Controlling Propaganda and Spillover from Di-
rect Broadcast Satellites, 5 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 167 (1967). See also Zhukov,
supra note 7.
47. See Smith, Pirate Broadcasting, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 769 (1968); See
also Comment, Direct Broadcasting From Satellites: The Case for Regulation,
3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 72 (1970).
48. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14 at art. 1.
49. 2 U.N. GAOR 14, U.N. Doe. A/519 (1948).
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of nations due to the fact that it is both technically difficult and
costly.50
The U.N. Charter specifically forbids the threat of force
against the sovereignty of another State.51 This is a sufficient
basis to make a case against threatening or warmongering propa-
ganda. The Outer Space Treaty expressly condemns propaganda
which may cause a breach of the peace or a threat of war.52  That
the Outer Space Treaty provides that outer space is to be used
only for peaceful purposes, reemphasizes that prohibition.
53
Theoretically, there does not appear to be a problem with
making a case against warmongering propaganda.54 However,
it is difficult for a group of nations to adequately define warmon-
gering propaganda. A routine communication received by two
adjacent nations could conceivably be called warmongering prop-
ganda in one nation and objective reporting in the other. Innoc-
uous television broadcasts could be interpreted as subtly urging
50. Difficulties in jamming are apparent in that:
Jamming is unquestionably effective as far as radio waves are con-
cerned, but a satellite broadcasting television signals presents singular
problems. Recalling that a DBS transmits high frequency television
signals in a line-of-sight manner which are then picked up by a para-
bolic or dish antenna, it is clear that one cannot jam them in the same
simple manner as lower frequency radio waves. Longer wave length
radio waves are reflected off the ionosphere, diffusing through the
whole space below and, in effect, arriving at the receiving antenna from
every direction. The television waves from a direct broadcast satellite
arrive at the receiving antenna in a single direction from the satellite.
To jam such waves, interfering waves must, according to the design of
the receiving antenna, arrive at approximately the same angle from
above. Therefore, depending on the selectivity of the receiving anten-
nas it is trying to overpower, an earth-bound jamming tower will only
be able to jam in a limited area around its base.
One may similarly jam the satellite as it is receiving its signals
from the originating earth station, for now a jamming station will be
able to approximate the line-of-sight taken by the target signal. But
this is technically difficult to accomplish and easy to counter. It ap-
pears that the sole means of reliable direct control left the ordinary
nation by the DBS concept is technically very difficult, if not impossi-
ble. If there is to be any guarantee of order, it must be imposed by
the agency controlling the satellites themselves.
Comment, Direct Broadcasting From Satellite: The Case For Regulation, 3
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 72, 81-82 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
51. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
52. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, Preamble.
53. Id.
54. Larson, The Present Status of Propaganda in International Law, 31
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 439, 442 (1966). Mr. Larson points out the five
sources of international law as expressed in the U.N. Charter, and goes on to
give examples of each where warmongering propaganda has been declared illegal.
See also Babrakov, War Propaganda: A Serious Crime Against Humanity, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 473 (1966).
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a nation's people to accept an adverse political doctrine or to
overthrow the government.
If it is difficult to recognize and regulate the most overt and
offensive type of propaganda, it is more difficult where the prop-
aganda is less offensive. 5  Many nations do consider the regu-
lation of propaganda to be of prime importance. Before a treaty
regulating D.B.S. can achieve this goal, there is a need for a more
workable definition and a better understanding of the term
"propaganda."
II. THE DOMESTIC LAW OF THE UNITED STATES AND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or the press; ... ."56 From this amend-
ment a substantial amount of case law has developed in an at-
tempt to help define the concept of freedom of speech and the
press in the United States.
A. Constitutional Nexus Between Treaties
and Free Information
With the approval of the Senate, the President can enter
into treaties which, along with the Constitution and Congressional
Acts, are a part of the supreme law of the land.57 The scope
of this power, however, has been the source of some controversy.
While the Constitution does not expressly limit the treaty making
power, the evolving case law has imposed some definite limita-
tions.5 The case of Missouri v. Holland, 9 involving a treaty be-
55. Falk, On Regulating International Propaganda: A Plea for Moderate
Aims, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 622 (1966). See also Von Glahn, The Case
for Legal Control of Liberation Propaganda, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 553
(1966).
56. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
57. The President of the United States has the power to enter into treaties,
subject to the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2.
The "Supremacy Clause" puts treaties on par with the Constitution and con-
gressional acts. Id., art. VI, § 2.
58. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1889).
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in its terms un-
limited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument
against the actions of the government or of its departments, and those
arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the
States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize
what the Constitution forbids. ...
59. 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
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tween the United States and Great Britain regulating the hunting
of game birds which migrate between Canada and the United
States, held that a treaty will not be enforced if it violates any
provision of the Constitution. Reid v. Covert,60 involving a treaty
between the United States and Japan, has been cited for the prin-
ciple that a treaty, to be enforceable as law, is certainly subject
to the constraints imposed by the Constitution."'
These cases indicate that a treaty entered into by the United
States will be subject to careful scrutiny to ensure that Constitu-
tional standards are met. By analogy, a treaty which seeks to
regulate the program content of satellite broadcasting must meet
the requirements of the first amendment.
Accordingly, the United States Government takes the posi-
tion that freedom of information is basic to a free society and
must be embodied in any treaty regulating satellite broadcast-
ing.62 To understand the scope of freedom of information, one
must examine the case law setting forth domestic standards gov-
erning that freedom. Although the freedom to speak and pub-
lish is guaranteed by the Constitution, there are certain limitations
upon that freedom.6" For example, laws which impose civil or
criminal sanctions for libelous utterances have been held valid.
6 4
Similarly, speech and writings of an obscene nature have not re-
ceived the full protection of the first amendment. 5  Speech
which tends to incite the listener to violate a criminal law6 6 or
advocates the participation in the active overthrow of the govern-
ment6 7 has also been prohibited.
60. 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957).
61. Ruddy, American Constitutional Law and Restrictions on the Content
of Private International Broadcasting, 5 INT'L LAw. 102, 107 (1971).
62. The State Department indicated that:
The approach of the Soviet proposal presents difficult problems because
it would affect very fundamental principles to which the United States
and many other countries attach cardinal importance. I refer to our
strong 200-year-old belief in the free exchange of information and
ideas. A primary basis for the maintenance of democratic institutions
is the controlling application of this principle, which is also, of course,
enshrined in the United Nations Charter.
67 U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL. 686 (1972).
63. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The Court states
that: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man
falsely shouting fire in a public theatre."
64. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
65. Miller v. Calif., 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
66. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
67. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
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To understand freedom of speech in the United States, it
is necessary to determine the method of regulation as well as
the type of speech regulated. Most of the proposals for the reg-
ulation of satellite broadcasting call for the evaluation of the pro-
gram content prior to broadcast. 68  United States case law has
set forth stringent requirements which must be adhered to before
a prior restraint may be imposed. 9  Statutes, regulations, and
injunctions which seek to prohibit publication or prevent expres-
sion before it occurs, have been held invalid unless specific re-
quirements are met. 70  Only in unusual circumstances, such as
war, have prior restraints been allowed to stand. 1' Thus, a treaty
which allows the government to censor program content prior to
broadcast would have to be very specific in its terms and imple-
menting legislation in order to meet Constitutional standards.
The requirements outlined above are apparently applicable
if control is to be exercised over the content of programs ema-
nating from the United States to either foreign or domestic
audiences. The fact that the Communications Satellite Act 72 has
created a quasi-commercial satellite system indicates that a large
number of the programs transmitted abroad will be commercially
produced and sponsored. While there is little doubt that the gov-
ernment can exercise some control over what is communicated
to other nations, 73 the extent of this regulation has not been
tested in the light of commercial programming. The restrictions
on the control of incoming programming will also be required
to stand up to Constitutional safeguards. The right of freedom
of information seems to encompass the right to receive informa-
tion not otherwise prohibited as well as to impart it.
74
68. Working Group Report, supra note 2, annex III and IV.
69. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Bantam Books v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58 (1963).
70. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
71. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
72. Communications Satellite Act of 1962, ,76 Stat. 419, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-
44 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as COMSAT]. The Act makes COMSAT
a corporation whose stock is traded publicly and whose officers are outside the
government. The corporation, however, works very closely with the govern-
ment. Id., at §§ 721, 732-734.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1948). Communications with foreign governments
which are intended to influence their relations with the United States are prohib-
ited.
74. Klien, Toward an Extension of the First Amendment: A Right of
Acquisition, 20 U. MAMI L. REv. 114 (1965) [hereinafter Klien].
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B. Constitutional Control of Propaganda
The desire of nations to exclude offensive propaganda seems
to be one of the main reasons for controlling program content.
The United States domestic law, enacted to regulate warmonger-
ing or subversive speech, outlines the types of speech which can
or cannot be regulated. However, the majority of the applicable
cases deal with the control of private propaganda initiated within
the territorial confines of the United States and directed toward
the overthrow of the receiving government. D.B.S. will pose sev-
eral new legal problem areas. There will be programs which
originate abroad and are authored both by governments and by
individuals. Programs designed for consumption in the United
States could be subject to some regulation. Public and private
broadcasts emanating from the United States and aimed at foreign
consumption may also generate a need for controls.
75
The control of the content of incoming programs, both pub-
lic and private, will also give rise to some practical problems.
If the United States Government seeks to regulate propaganda con-
tained in this type of programming, the cases which construe the
Smith Act 76 will be applicable. The Smith Act was designed to
regulate that type of speech advocating the illegal overthrow of
the United States Government by force or violence. The act,
and case law interpreting it, specifically set out the type of speech
which can be regulated.
The constitutional validity of the Smith Act was upheld in
Dennis v. United States.77 The Supreme Court held that Con-
gress has the power to protect the government from violent over-
throw and that any expression or utterance designed to incite
such a result could be limited.78 The Smith Act, however, does
not limit the teaching or advocacy of the overthrow of the govern-
ment as an abstract principle. The speech must be aimed at
the advocacy of violent action toward the goal of overthrowing
the government by force.7" The requirement that the violent
action be imminent has also been imposed by the Supreme
75. Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and The Suppression of Warmon-
gering Propaganda in the United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 530 (1966).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 10 (1946), as amended 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
77. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
78. Id., at 499-500.
79. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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Court.80 Using this standard, the only type of incoming propa-
ganda which can be regulated by the government is that which
incites imminent action in the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment of the United States.
Government regulation of the content of its official outgoing
programs designed for foreign consumption is not likely to raise
any Constitutional issues.8" Commercial programming originat-
ing in the United States and designed for consumption abroad
will be subject to some governmental controls under the provi-
sions of the Communications Satellite Act. COMSAT, being a
quasi-public organization, must work closely with the United
States Department of State.82 The power of the government to
conduct foreign relations may also be invoked to aid in finding
a Constitutional basis for regulating this type of propaganda.8
The greatest problems are likely to arise in the regulation
of propaganda emanating from abroad. The question of stand-
ing to bring a suit to determine if freedom of speech has been
violated when an individual is denied access to information is not
fully settled. 4 Lamont v. Postmaster General may be read as
granting standing to one who has been denied the right of access
to information. 5
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS
OF THE U.S.S.R. AND CANADA-SWEDEN PROPOSALS
The Working Group received two documents addressing the
control of D.B.S. at their meeting in 1973.86 The U.S.S.R. pro-
posal was presented for consideration as a treaty.87  It has also
been submitted to the Legal Sub-Committee for its considera-
80. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
81. Van Alstyne, supra note 75 at 531, 532.
82. Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 419, 47 U.S.C. §§ 721,
741, 742 (1964).
83. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
84. Klien, supra note 74.
85. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1966). In this case, La-
mont, as addressee to correspondence, was able to assert first amendment rights
even though not the initiator of the speech. Justice Brennnan, in his concurring
opinion, saw it as a question of access to speech. "The dissemination of ideas
can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and
consider them." Id., at 308.
86. Working Group Report, supra note 2, annex I and IV.
87. Id., annex I.
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tion.85  The joint proposal of Canada and Sweden was presented
as a working paper to aid in further study of the control of
D.B.S. s9 Although not presented for consideration as a treaty,
its reception at the meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space indicates that some of the principles ad-
vanced are likely to be incorporated into a treaty.90
A. U.S.S.R. Convention on Principles Governing the Use
by States of Artificial Earth Satellites
for Direct Television Broadcasting
The preamble to the U.S.S.R. proposal calls attention to the
possibility that D.B.S. may bring about problems of a political,
social, and legal nature. The preamble also contains a statement
that the "misuse" of such broadcasts could be detrimental to a
States' interest. The preamble emphasizes that the reduction of
possible conflicts between States is the purpose of the proposal.
The Outer Space Treaty and the U.N. Charter are referred to
in the preamble and considered applicable to aid as a legal basis
for the regulation. 9
The United States will probably protest the present wording
of the preamble because of its negative connotations. 2 The ma-
jor emphasis of the wording of the preamble is on potential con-
flicts. Only one phrase speaks toward the potential benefits of
D.B.S.9 3 Additionally since article 19 of the Declaration of Human
Rights is not mentioned anywhere in the proposal, the United
States will oppose this proposal.94
Article I, paragraph 1, of the U.S.S.R. proposal, states that
direct satellite broadcasting:
[S]hall be carried out exclusively in the interests of peace,
progress, the development of mutual understanding, and the
88. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.
105/P.V. 122 (1973).
89. Working Group Report, supra note 2, annex IV.
90. 28 U.N. GAOR, Report of the Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Supp. 20 at 13, U.N. Doc. A/9020 (1973).
91. Working Group Report, supra note 2, annex III, at 1.
92. This has been the position of the State Dep't as indicated in 67 U.S.
DEP'T STATE BULL. 687 (1972).
93. Working Group Report, supra note 2, annex III, at 1. See also text
accompanying note 95 infra.
94. See note 11 supra. It seems that the State Dep't has taken this as
an essential element.
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strengthening of friendly relations between all States and
peoples. 95
This will not raise any problems because the United States has
consistently maintained that peace development and anR under-
standing of different societies is a major goal of D.B.S.
Article III of the proposal would limit the transmission of
commercial messages or advertising to instances where the na-
tions involved have agreements allowing the transmission of such
messages.96 The power of the United States Government to reg-
ulate foreign commerce could be invoked as a legal basis for the
acceptance of this article. 97 However, there are practical consid-
erations which may mitigate against acceptance of article H. The
overwhelming majority of United States programming is paid for
by advertising. This specific prohibition could cut down on the
number and quality of programs from the United States. A pos-
sible solution is a compromise whereby commercial messages
carry only the name of the company which sponsors the program.
Article IV would also raise Constitutional questions.9" This
article excludes "any material publicizing ideas of war, mili-
tarism, nazism, national and racial hatred and enmity between
peoples . . . ." Material which is "immoral" or interferes with
the conduct of domestic or foreign affairs is also proscribed. This
type of wording clearly conflicts with both the constitutional prin-
ciples surrounding the Smith Act'00 and with the regulations on
the use of prior restraints.' 0 ' Article IV may also raise questions
of an international nature. The international bans on propaganda
are limited to prohibiting that type of propaganda which tends
to cause a breach of the peace. Article IV would extend the
prohibition to even "publicizing" ideas of war or political philoso-
phies which tend to be less than democratic.
Article V raises similar objections by eliminating all broad-
casts which have not been expressly consented to by the receiving
State. 02 The United States would consider this prohibition an
95. Working Group Report, supra note 2, annex HI, at 2.
96. Working Group Report, supra note 2, annex III, at 2.
97. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
98. Working Group Report, supra note 2, annex III, at 2.
99. Id.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 10 (1946), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
101. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
102. Working Group Report, supra note 2, annex HI, at 2.
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unconstitutional prior restraint.'0 3 Additionally, it is contrary to
the Declaration of Human Rights since it does away with the free-
dom to send and receive information across national bound-
aries.10 4  The concept of national sovereignty over ones air
space, however, is one basis for considering article V as meeting
minimum international legal standards. 10 5
Article VI restates the illegality of broadcasts as stated in
article IV and points out the following particular types of broad-
casts considered offensive:
a. Broadcasts detrimental to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security;
b. Broadcasts representing interference in intra-State con-
flicts of any kind;
c. Broadcasts involving an encroachment on fundamental
human rights, on the dignity and worth of the human person
and on fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language or religion;
d. Broadcasts propagandizing violence, horrors, pornog-
raphy and the use of narcotics;
e. Broadcasts undermining the foundations of the local civil-
ization, culture, way of life, traditions or language;
f. Broadcasts which misinform the public on these or other
matters. 106
Some of these prohibitions are likely to be viewed as illegal prior
restraints.' 0 7  There are also Smith Act problems raised by this
article.' Some of the provisions are overbroad in that they in-
clude protected speech and require the speaker to act as a cen-
sor. 109 A lack of any positive international law to cover these
situations may or may not mitigate against acceptance. Strict ad-
herence to the principle of free flow of information under the
103. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
104. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 31.
105. Estep & Kearse, Space Communications and the Law: Adequate Con-
trols after 1963?, 60 MiCH. L. REv. 873, 879-884 (1962).
106. Working Group Report, supra note 2, annex III, at 2-3.
107. These provisions require a State to refrain from types of broadcasting
which may not bring about the harm sought to be regulated. See Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
108. Paragraphs a, b, e & f do not, on their face, seem to meet the require-
ments of the U.S. case law. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
109. If a regulation of speech is so broad that it regulates speech which is
protected by the Constitution, as well as that which is unprotected, it is over-
broad. U.S. v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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Declaration of Human Rights would prohibit an acceptance of
article VI." 0
Article VII may also be adverse to the interests of the
United States. The article prohibits broadcasting by organiza-
tions which are not controlled by the government of the State
in which the organization is located."' It is uncertain whether
-the U.S.S.R. considers that COMSAT"' is controlled by the gov-
ernment. If the U.S.S.R. does consider COMSAT to be a com-
mercial organization, operating apart from government control,
it is unlikely that the United States would sign a treaty contain-
ing article VII.
The U.S.S.R. proposal raises both constitutional and interna-
tional issues in its efforts to control the content of programs car-
ried by D.B.S. The nature of the problems raised are so basic
to the United States concept of freedom of speech that it is un-
likely that the proposal could be accepted by the United States
if offered as a treaty.
B. Draft Principles Governing Direct Broadcasting
by Satellite by Canada and Sweden
The Canadian-Swedish proposal is much less restrictive than
the proposal by the U.S.S.R. The preamble contains many refer-
ences to the positive aspects of D.B.S."1 ' One paragraph specifi-
cally states that satellite broadcasting:
[M]ust be governed by international law so as to ensure the
free flow of communications on a basis of respect for the
sovereign rights of States and the principles of non-interven-
tion and equality ... .14
The international concepts of freedom of information which serve
as the legal foundation for their proposal cover a wider range
than those contained in the U.S.S.R. proposal. The Canadian-
Swedish proposal mentions the Human Rights Declaration and
the International Covenant on Human Rights. 11
5
Article II of the Canadian-Swedish proposal directs itself to
the manner in which satellite broadcasting should be carried out.
110. -See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3 1.
111. Working Group Report, supra note 2, annex III, at 2.
112. See COMSAT, supra note 72.
113. Working Group Report, supra note 2, annex IV.
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Direct television broadcasting by satellite shall be car-
ried out in a manner compatible with the maintenance of
international peace and security, the development of mutual
understanding and the strengthening of friendly relations
among all States and peoples. Such broadcasting shall also
be conducted on the basis of respect for the principles of
the sovereignty of States, non-intervention and equality and
in the interest of promoting the free flow of communica-
tions. 116
Although there is a definite emphasis on the free flow of commu-
nications, parts of the proposal can be interpreted in a manner
which would restrict the flow of information. The statement that
"Broadcasting shall also be conducted on the basis of respect
for the principles of the sovereignty of States . . . ,117 presents
such a possibility. This would be contrary to the Declaration of
Human Rights section which states that one has the right to seek
and receive information across national boundaries. 18  Since
broadcasting "shall be carried out in a manner compatible with
the maintenance of international peace and security . . . ," 9 ar-
ticle II will raise issues under the United States Constitution as
it seems vague and overbroad.1
20
Article V requires that there be no broadcasts to another
State without the consent of the receiving State.' 2 ' This could
raise the same issues as article V of the U.S.S.R. proposal.
122
This also indicates that if the Canadian-Swedish proposal is ac-
cepted as a treaty, there will be a need for negotiating bilateral
treaties before States may broadcast to one another. The greater
the number of bilateral and regional treaties required, the greater
the possibility of restricting the free flow of information.
The Canadian-Swedish proposal is certainly less restrictive
than the U.S.S.R. proposal in its wording. This could serve to
render it defective under the United States Constitution. The
proposal does not specifically state the types of speech to be pro-
hibited under article II. The Constitutional requirements for
specificity in regulations of speech may not be met without a pre-
116. Id., at 2.
117. Id., at 2.
118. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 31.
119. Working Group Report, supra note 2, annex IV, at 3.
120. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
121. Working Group Report, supra note 2, annex IV, at 3.
122. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
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cise definition of what is sought to be regulated. 123 The Canadian-
Swedish proposal is close to the United States position on freedom
of speech. With a few refinements of the articles which do not
meet Constitutional standards, this proposal would be close to be-
ing acceptable by the United States as a treaty.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Constitution of the United States and the case law
which interprets it, place very stringent limitations upon the gov-
ernmental control of speech. A treaty, like any other law, is
subject to judicial review to determine whether it meets Consti-
tutional standards.' 24 The Department of State has taken the
position that the domestic concepts of freedom of speech will play
a determinative role in the negotiation and signing of a treaty
regulating D.B.S. 125 The United States is not likely to enter into
a -treaty which does not meet the Constitutional requirements
of freedom of speech. The two proposals offered by the U.S.S.R.
and Canada-Sweden do not yet meet the required standards.
However, the need for some type of regulation of D.B.S. is ap-
parent.
In the forum of the United Nations, there is general agree-
ment that peace and mutual understanding are highly desirable.
D.B.S., through the spread of information and education, can
help achieve peace and understanding. While D.B.S. could be
misused as an instrument of propaganda designed to incite war
or internal strife, there is no reason to believe that a treaty cannot
be negotiated which will respect the desire to stop warmongering
propaganda and still allow for the free flow of information. The
use of the United States' concept of freedom of speech could
aid in those negotiations.
There is little doubt that an attempt to utilize domestic con-
cepts of freedom of speech on an international scale will meet
with some opposition. 12  The domestic principles of freedom of
123. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
124. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1 (1957). See also text accompanying note 59 supra.
125. See 67 U.S. DEP'T STATE BuLL. 686 (1972) and 69 U.S. DEP'T STATE
BULL. 19 (1973).
126. It has been stated that:
We start with the traditional libertarian premise that restrictions on ex-
pression are to be viewed with disfavor and confined as narrowly as
possible. Nevertheless . .. we conclude that an effort to achieve a
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speech have taken more than 200 years to develop. The inter-
national principles dealing with the subject are much more re-
cent. Many nations have not grown up with as strict an adher-
ence to this principle which has helped shape our institutions
and society. However, if other nations are sincerely interested
in regulating propaganda and preserving the free flow of informa-
tion, the United States' concepts are the most useful from which
to achieve both goals.
Elton Rex Brown III
kind of global first amendment would be doomed to failure and would
be widely misread as an attempt to reach foreign audiences for the fi-
nancial profit and political advantage of this country.
Chayes & Chazen, Policy Problems In Direct Broadcasting From Satellites,
5 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 4, 13 (1970).
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